'Bootstrap' redirects here. For the web design tool, see.

And Armstrong, D. (2014), Bootstrap Confidence Regions for Multidimensional Scaling Solutions. American Journal of Political Science, 58.

For other uses, see. In general, bootstrapping usually refers to a self-starting process that is supposed to proceed without external input.

In the term (usually shortened to booting) usually refers to the process of loading the basic software into the memory of a computer after power-on or general reset, especially the which will then take care of loading other software as needed. The term appears to have originated in the early 19 th-century United States (particularly in the phrase 'pull oneself over a fence by one's bootstraps') to mean an absurdly impossible action, an. A pair of boots with one bootstrap visible Tall may have a tab, loop or handle at the top known as a bootstrap, allowing one to use fingers or a tool to help pulling the boots on. The 'to ' was already in use during the 19 th century as an example of an impossible task. The dates at least to 1834, when it appeared in the Workingman's Advocate: 'It is conjectured that Mr. Murphee will now be enabled to hand himself over the Cumberland river or a barn yard fence by the straps of his boots.'

In 1860 it appeared in a comment on: 'The attempt of the mind to analyze itself [is] an effort analogous to one who would lift himself by his own bootstraps.' Bootstrap as a metaphor, meaning to better oneself by one's own unaided efforts, was in use in 1922. This metaphor spawned additional metaphors for a series of self-sustaining processes that proceed without external help. Main articles: and Booting is the process of starting a computer, specifically with regard to starting its software. The process involves a chain of stages, in which at each stage a smaller, simpler program loads and then executes the larger, more complicated program of the next stage.

It is in this sense that the computer 'pulls itself up by its bootstraps', i.e. It improves itself by its own efforts. Booting is a chain of events that starts with execution of hardware-based procedures and may then hand-off to and software which is loaded into.

Booting often involves processes such as performing, loading settings, loading a,, a, an,. The computer term bootstrap began as a metaphor in the 1950s. In computers, pressing a bootstrap button caused a to read a bootstrap program from an input unit. The computer would then execute the bootstrap program, which caused it to read more program instructions. It became a self-sustaining process that proceeded without external help from manually entered instructions. As a computing term, bootstrap has been used since at least 1953. Software development [ ] Bootstrapping can also refer to the development of successively more complex, faster programming environments.

The simplest environment will be, perhaps, a very basic text editor ( e.g., ) and an program. Using these tools, one can write a more complex text editor, and a simple compiler for a higher-level language and so on, until one can have a and an extremely. Historically, bootstrapping also refers to an early technique for computer program development on new hardware. The technique described in this paragraph has been replaced by the use of a executed by a pre-existing computer. Bootstrapping in program development began during the 1950s when each program was constructed on paper in decimal code or in binary code, bit by bit (1s and 0s), because there was no high-level computer language, no, no assembler, and no.

A tiny assembler program was hand-coded for a new computer (for example the ) which converted a few instructions into binary or decimal code: A1. This simple assembler program was then rewritten in its just-defined but with extensions that would enable the use of some additional mnemonics for more complex operation codes. The enhanced assembler's source program was then assembled by its predecessor's executable (A1) into binary or decimal code to give A2, and the cycle repeated (now with those enhancements available), until the entire instruction set was coded, branch addresses were automatically calculated, and other conveniences (such as conditional assembly, macros, optimisations, etc.) established. This was how the early assembly program SOAP () was developed. Compilers, linkers, loaders, and utilities were then coded in assembly language, further continuing the bootstrapping process of developing complex software systems by using simpler software. The term was also championed by to refer to his belief that organizations could better evolve by improving the process they use for improvement (thus obtaining a compounding effect over time).

His team that developed the hypertext system applied this strategy by using the tool they had developed to improve the tool. Compilers [ ]. Main articles: and Bootstrapping is a technique used to iteratively improve a 's performance. Seed AI is a hypothesized type of capable of. Having improved itself, it would become better at improving itself, potentially leading to an exponential increase in intelligence. No such AI is known to exist, but it remains an active field of research. Seed AI is a significant part of some theories about the: proponents believe that the development of seed AI will rapidly yield ever-smarter intelligence (via bootstrapping) and thus a new era.

[ ] Statistics [ ]. Neo Geo Rom Ng Sfix Roman. Main articles: and Bootstrapping is using very general consistency criteria to determine the form of a quantum theory from some assumptions on the spectrum of particles or operators. Magnetically confined fusion plasmas [ ] In fusion devices, bootstrapping refers to the process in which a is self-generated by the plasma, which reduces or eliminates the need for an external current driver. Maximising the bootstrap current is a major goal of advanced tokamak designs. Inertially confined fusion plasmas [ ] Bootstrapping in refers to the alpha particles produced in the fusion reaction providing further heating to the plasma. This heating leads to ignition and an overall energy gain. Electronics [ ].

Main article: An electric power grid is almost never brought down intentionally. Generators and power stations are started and shut down as necessary. A typical power station requires power for start up prior to being able to generate power. This power is obtained from the grid, so if the entire grid is down these stations cannot be started. Therefore, to get a grid started, there must be at least a small number of power stations that can start entirely on their own.

A is the process of restoring a power station to operation without relying on external power. In the absence of grid power, one or more black starts are used to bootstrap the grid. Cellular networks [ ]. This section does not any. (December 2015) () A media bootstrap is the process whereby a story or meme is deliberately (but artificially) produced by self and peer-referential journalism, originally within a tight circle of media content originators, often commencing with stories written within the same media organization. This story is then expanded into a general media 'accepted wisdom' with the aim of having it accepted as self-evident 'common knowledge' by the reading, listening and viewing publics.

The key feature of a media bootstrap is that as little hard, verifiable, external evidence as possible is used to support the story, preference being given to the citation (often unattributed) of other media stories, i.e. 'journalists interviewing journalists'. Because the campaign is usually originated and at least initially concocted internally by a media organization with a particular agenda in mind, within a closed loop of reportage and opinionation, the campaign is said to have 'pulled itself up by its own bootstraps'.

A bootstrap campaign should be distinguished from a genuine news story of genuine interest, such as a natural disaster that kills thousands, or the death of a respected public figure. It is legitimate for these stories to be given coverage across all media platforms. What distinguishes a bootstrap from a real story is the contrived and organized manner in which the bootstrap appears to come out of nowhere. A bootstrap commonly claims to be tapping a hitherto unrecognized phenomenon within society. As self- by pulling on one's bootstraps is physically impossible, this is often used by the bootstrappers themselves to deny the possibility that the bootstrap campaign is indeed concocted and artificial.

They assert that it has arisen via a groundswell of public opinion. Media campaigns that are openly admitted as concocted ( e.g. A public service campaign titled 'Let's Clean Up Our City') are usually ignored by other media organizations for reasons related to competition. On the other hand, the true bootstrap welcomes the participation of other media organizations, indeed encourages it, as this participation gains the bootstrap notoriety and, most importantly, legitimacy. See also [ ] • • • • • • 's short sci-fi story •, an institute founded by Douglas Engelbart • References [ ].

•, Michael Quinion • (Mailing list). Archived from on 2009-01-29. • ^ (Mailing list).

• ^ Jan Freeman,,, January 27, 2009 • Jan Freeman,,, January 25, 2009 • cited in the Oxford English Dictionary • • Buchholz, Werner (1953). 'The System Design of the IBM Type 701 Computer'. Proceedings of the I.R.E.

41 (10): 1273.. • Francis, Paul (2000-04-02). Retrieved 2008-12-24. • Traversat; et al. Retrieved 2008-12-23.

• Saxena; et al. In ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks (SASN) 2003. Retrieved 2008-12-24. Scott Armstrong (2001). Principles of Forecasting: A Handbook for Researchers and Practitioners.

Kluwer Academic Publishers. • • Richard Dawkins, River Out of Eden, pages 23-25, 1995 (paper) • Bradley Efron; Elizabeth Halloran & Susan Holmes (1996). Retrieved 11 June 2013. External links [ ] Look up,, or in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.

Kenneth Armstrong: Bootstrapping Brexit: A European Rescue of the Nation State? In a published on 20 th October, the European Union Select Committee of the House of Lords set out the argument for close parliamentary scrutiny of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union. The central claim made in the report is that a middle path may be found between the Government’s apparent preference for retrospective scrutiny of its EU-level negotiations and what the Government considers to be attempts at parliamentary micromanagement of the withdrawal process. What motivates this search for a middle way is a belief that parliamentary scrutiny can serve the instrumental purpose of contributing to the success of the negotiations. The report suggests that in procedural terms, Parliament might ensure that government is taking proper advice and consulting the right people and in more substantive terms, the Government’s position might be enhanced through parliamentary testing of its position in light of available information and analysis.

The focus of this analysis is not an evaluation of the instrumental qualities of parliamentary scrutiny. Instead it is argued that the report bootstraps its arguments for parliamentary involvement in Brexit by resort to the resources of European constitutional law. To be clear, it is not suggested that European constitutional law dictates or determines the role of the UK parliament: that would be to transgress the boundaries between the EU and national legal orders.

But rather that the role ascribed to the European Parliament in the scrutiny of international agreements entered into on behalf of the EU provides a resource through which to shape and direct the institutional position of the UK’s parliament in scrutinising Brexit. In its report, the Lords’ European Union Committee attaches great significance to a statement given in evidence to the Committee by the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, David Davis, when he said that the government, in its dealings with Parliament, would ‘certainly match and, hopefully, improve on what the European Parliament sees’. The idea that the UK Parliament might end up having less of a scrutinising role than the European Parliament has been raised a number of times to makes the case for stronger parliamentary influence over Brexit. What is interesting about the Lords’ report is the manner in which it seeks to put flesh on the bones of that argument by direct reference to the procedures and mechanisms that give the European Parliament a significant substantive role in the EU’s conduct of international negotiations. The description of the EP as a ‘world leader in parliamentary diplomacy’. It was not always so.

Indeed, as regards the EU’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP), this was a domain traditionally dominated by the EU’s executive branches. Based on a mandate agreed in the Council, it was for the European Commission to negotiate on behalf of the Union, subject to regular reporting to a committee of national representatives.

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, Article 207(3) TFEU now provides that that the Commission shall also report regularly to the EP on the progress of negotiations. This might seem a fairly flimsy parliamentary foothold and barely one upon which to bootstrap any domestic parliamentary claims of influence and oversight over the Brexit negotiations. Rather, the real bite comes in Article 218 TFEU which gives additional detail to the institutional procedures to be followed when negotiating international agreements.

In particular, it requires the consent of the European Parliament to the conclusion of a range of different international agreements, including trade agreements which either form part of a wider ‘association agreement’ or are concluded under the CCP in fields where the ordinary legislative process is engaged in implementation of the agreement. In short, the consent of the EP has become the norm for the EU’s international agreements except for the reserved domain of foreign and security policy. It is this downstream capacity for veto (‘exit’) that enhances upstream EP engagement (‘voice’) when negotiating positions are being determined. The EP has not been afraid to exercise its power of veto,.

It refused its consent to the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) agreement and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). Therefore, the position of the EP has to be taken into account and not just by the EU institutions but also by the partners with whom the EU negotiates.

But, instead of waiting to the end of the process to seek retrospective EP approval – with the risk that it will be denied – institutional practice has shifted in ways that give the EP influence from the beginning of the procedure. Indeed, it is a feature of the constitutional architecture of the EU that the formal provisions of the treaties are often subject to institutional agreements that clarify and in some instances expand the powers of institutions under the treaties. This is especially so in respect of the powers of the EP when the EU negotiates international agreements. In terms of the, the EP ‘shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements, including the definition of negotiating directives’. More detailed procedural rules are set out in Annex III of the Framework Agreement. It is based on these European norms that the House of Lords European Committee identified four core principles which it suggested should underpin parliamentary involvement: • Parliamentary committees should have access – including on a confidential basis – to a wide range of relevant documents; • Documentation should be supplied in sufficient time for committees to express their views and for Government to take those views into account; • A ‘comply-or-explain’ approach to any recommendations made by committees; and • Procedures to safeguard confidential information. But to what extent is it appropriate to bootstrap the constitutional position of the UK Parliament by reference to that of the European Parliament?

Or to put it another way, how does the constitutionalisation of the role of the EP in international negotiations compare to that of the UK Parliament? There are two points to consider. The first is whether UK constitutional law gives the UK Parliament an analogous right to ‘consent’ to an agreement prior to its ratification. The second is whether the role of the EP under Article 50 TEU is wholly analogous to its role under Article 218 TFEU.

In 2009, the year that the Lisbon Treaty endowed the EP with its powers over international treaties, it was possible to write that,. Instead the UK parliament had a highly limited oversight under a constitutional convention: the Ponsonby convention. However, the provisions of gave legal force to that convention and now sets down a set of rules for Parliament’s involvement in the ratification of treaties. This entails the laying of a text of a treaty before both Houses of Parliament for 21 days. In the absence of any objection, the government may then proceed to ratification. It is for either House to seek to pass a resolution objecting to ratification. If a resolution is passed, then government must provide a statement of its reasons why it wishes to proceed to ratification.

If such a resolution is passed by the Lords alone, then following the provision of the ministerial statement, the government may still proceed to ratification. If the Commons passes such a resolution, then a ratification stand-still follows for another 21 days from the ministerial statement during which period it may again pass a resolution objecting to ratification. As the Act makes clear, this process can be repeated which suggests that the Commons may continue to object to ratification of a treaty. As, the provisions of the 2010 Act are a set of constitutional ‘default’ rules.

This default applies to the extent that more specific rules do not apply. The subsequent provides stronger constitutional safeguards through requirements of a referendum and/or Act of Parliament in respect of certain future EU treaty changes. A couple of observations can be made. The direction of constitutional travel has certainly been in favour of enhancing the UK Parliament’s role prior to the ratification of a treaty by the Government. Indeed, the speed of travel has been accelerated as a consequence of the UK’s membership of the EU with enhanced involvement where EU treaties are concerned. But as the Attorney General submitted during the course of the Article 50 litigation before the High Court, such parliamentary oversight has been confined to the domestic management of the consequences of an international negotiation which leads to a new or revised treaty. It is only once the negotiation is completed that retrospectively Parliament is required to be involved prior to formal ratification.

It is central to the Attorney General’s cases that these ‘end-of-pipe’ parliamentary processes neither remove nor constrain the exercise of the Royal Prerogative at the point at which negotiations begin. In any event, whereas the enhanced role of the EP in the oversight of negotiations is directly linked to its powers of consent, the scrutiny practices of the UK Parliament can simply be adjusted and applied even in the absence of stronger powers at the end of the process. Parliament found the means and mechanisms through which to exert scrutiny as the ill-fated EU Constitutional Treaty was being negotiated even before the provisions of the 2010 Act were being considered. In part that may be due to the means by which the Constitutional Treaty was negotiated: a constitutional convention was established with input from parliamentarians at both EU and national level. So perhaps again the domestic arrangements may have been a response in part to developments within European constitutionalism.

But the point is that it is for Parliament itself to define its own procedures for scrutinising Brexit whether or not it possessed the ultimate power to consent to the ratification of the withdrawal agreement. Even if we assume that there could be an analogy between the relative positions of the EP and the UK Parliament, a more intriguing question is whether the role of the EP under Article 50 TEU is comparable to its role under Article 218 TFEU. At first blush this seems like a rather spurious point.

After all Article 50(2) TEU states in terms that a withdrawal agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218 (3) TFEU and concluded by the Council on behalf of the Union having obtained the consent of the EP. It is therefore, unarguable that the EP will have to consent to any agreement adopted under Article 50 TEU in like manner to its constitutional function under Article 218 TFEU. In accepting the EP’s unarguable formal role as laid down in Article 50 TEU, it is, nonetheless, worth reflecting on what lies behind that role. It is suggested that there are two conflations that render Article 50 TEU constitutionally ambiguous. The first conflation is between the expression in EU law of a state’s international law right to withdraw from a treaty (and in this case, its departure from an international organisation), and, the negotiation of an agreement between the EU and the withdrawing state detailing the consequential effects of that withdrawal. It would have been perfectly possible for Article 50 TEU to have adopted a rather minimalist approach that did no more that specify the right of a Member State to withdraw by notifying the European Council of its intention with some act of confirmation of the withdrawal decision by that state after the expiry of a period of time.

From an intergovernmentalist perspective there would be no obvious need for the involvement of the EP: the UK as a state party to the treaties would simply withdraw, with any domestic constitutional oversight being a matter for that state itself. Of course, the retort might be that the EU treaties are more than an agreement between states and the constitutional role of the EP in the Article 48 TEU process for amending the treaties has increased. Nonetheless, the formal power remains with the Member States acting by unanimity to adopt any treaty amendments and the power of ratification remains with the Member States subject to their own parliamentary and constitutional process. To put it bluntly it is not obvious why the EP should have a role in the withdrawal process at all.

The answer, of course, is that the process of withdrawal and the adoption of an agreement between the EU and the withdrawing state has been conflated. And here’s where the second conflation occurs. It is perfectly understandable that a withdrawal agreement might be desirable to manage some of the immediately consequential effects of withdrawal including transitional arrangements. But that is a rather different proposition from an agreement that purports to govern significant substantive aspects of that state’s future relationship with the EU. Unfortunately, Article 50 TEU does not draw such a distinction. However, it seems likely that the details of a future trade and cooperation deal between the UK and the EU will be negotiated separately from the Article 50 agreement itself.

Indeed, it is open to argument that Article 50 TEU would not provide an adequate legal basis for a comprehensive trade and cooperation deal which ought instead to be negotiated having regard to the normal legal bases found in the treaties and the respective role of the EP under the institutional procedures that apply to those legal bases. So while there might be good reason to draw an analogy with the powers of the EP, and for parallel domestic parliamentary involvement, at the point where the future trade and cooperation relationship between the UK and the EU is being negotiated, a withdrawal agreement alone need not have necessitated a role for the EP. But in having conflated these different agreements it is plain that Article 50 TEU does accord a right of consent to the EP. The conclusion might well be that, in an ironic twist, it is the constitutional and democratic qualities of the EU – much maligned in the referendum campaign – that are called upon to rescue parliamentary democracy in the UK. The gaps in an under-constitutionalised UK are being filled by reference to the resources of a constitutionalised – or perhaps – EU.

Kenneth Armstrong is Professor of European Law, University of Cambridge (Suggested citation: K. Armstrong, ‘Bootstrapping Brexit: A European Rescue of the Nation State?’ U.K. Blog (27th Oct 2016) (available at )).